War Jokes

(another of the infamous Johnnie Walker ads in Lebanon prepared by the local office of Leo Burnett)

Abul Abed and Other Jokes Make Post-War Healing Process Easy

Lebanese may have lost homes, loved ones and livelihoods, but one thing they haven't lost in the aftermath of the war is their legendary sense of humor. Jokes helped them survive Israel's devastating military onslaught and are now making the post-war healing process a lot easier.

Anecdotes are to be found everywhere -- in living rooms, text messages, television shows, e-mails and even blogs, where some Israeli users have been less than amused. Amid sad stories about lost loved ones, destroyed homes and impoverished people who had to live in public schools, they joke about everything: the Israelis, the Americans, the Arabs, but mostly they tell self-deprecating gags.

Three Hizbullah fighters run out of Beirut's southern suburbs after Israeli raids, flashing the victory sign. Actually, no. They were really pointing out that there were only two buildings left standing.

Why did rents go up in Ain el-Rummaneh district overlooking the southern suburbs? Because it has sea view now!

Why are coquettish elderly Lebanese women very happy about the war? Because it took them back 30 years.

Why will Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah win the Nobel Prize for Education? Because he is the only man who sent one million people to school in just two days.

But they also tell jokes of bravery against the Israelis.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was sitting in his office wondering how to invade Lebanon when his telephone rang. Beirut's most famous imaginary character announces to him in a heavily accented voice: "This is Abul Abed and I am calling to tell you that we are officially declaring war on you." "How big is your army?" replies Olmert. "Right now," said Abul Abed, "there is myself, my cousin Mustafa, my next-door neighbor Abu Khaled, and the whole team from the tea house. That makes eight!"Olmert paused. "I must tell you Abul Abed, that I have one million men in my army waiting to move on my command."Abul Abed paused, then said: "Mr. Olmert, the war is still on! We have managed to acquire some infantry equipment!""And what equipment would that be Abul Abed?", Olmert asked. "Well sir, we have two Mercedes 180s, and a truck.""I must tell you Abul Abed that I have 10,000 bombers and 20,000 fighter planes. My military complex is surrounded by laser-guided, surface-to-air missile sites. And since we last spoke, I've increased my army to two million!""Mr. Olmert, we have to call off this war," said Abul Abed."I'm sorry to hear that," said Olmert. "Why the sudden change of heart?""Well," said Abul Abed, "we've come to realize that there is no way we can feed two million prisoners!"

Israel's systematic destruction of bridges in the offensive launched after Hizbullah captured two Israeli soldiers on July 12 has also been a source of inspiration.

Olmert sent a commando operation deep into Lebanon. Mission: Capture Lebanese diva Fairuz. He insists on finding the only bridge he did not destroy: an imaginary bridge evoked for decades in a romantic Fairuz aria."On the bridge 'Lawziyeh,' under the shade of the leaves," goes the song.

Early one day, a man rushes desperately to the dentist. "Please take out my bridge, or the Israelis will bomb it!"

Advertising agencies have also entered the game. A gigantic black poster covers the entire side of a five-story building: It shows the golden Johnnie Walker character with his top hat and waistcoast blithely striding after leaping over a gap on a destroyed bridge. Internet users are sharing a picture of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in the arms of Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in light summer clothes, standing under the shade of palm trees at a sandy beach. It is a parody of the "Axe Effect" attraction campaign by the namesake deodorant brand.

Jokes are also abundant about the Arabs too. After Saudi Arabia decided to donate half a billion dollars to rebuild Lebanon, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ordered the capture of six Israeli soldiers at the border.

Amid a mass evacuation of foreign nationals from Lebanon, Palestinian refugees who have been stranded in Lebanon for nearly 60 years are ecstatic: the Palestinian Authority has decided to evacuate its nationals as well.

But in a country that has repeatedly been invaded by Israel, the one joke everyone likes to tell remains: An Israeli recently arrives at London's Heathrow airport. As he fills out a form, the customs officer asks him: "Occupation?" The Israeli promptly replies: "No, just visiting!"

(AFP)

IDF Report Card

This is a long article that was published in the Jerusalem Post (Aug.24) on the strategy behind the Israeli offensive in Lebanon. It is a fascinating read into what happened, how it happened and why it happened. The original article can be found here.
mrtez

IDF Report Card

On July 11, IDF Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz picked up the phone and called a hotel in the North to make a reservation for a family vacation. Two days before that, OC Northern Command Maj.-Gen. Udi Adam held a security assessment at headquarters in Safed and decided to lower the level of alert along the northern border, raised two weeks earlier following the kidnapping of Cpl. Gilad Shalit in the Gaza Strip.
On July 12, however, Halutz's plans for a vacation went down the drain and instead of going up north to relax, the chief of staff flew up to direct Israel's war against Hizbullah. Two reservists had been kidnapped in a cross-border attack and the government had decided to launch a military offensive in Lebanon.
The decision itself was a major shift in Israeli policy. Since the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Israel has largely restrained itself in the face of Hizbullah provocations. The kidnapping of three soldiers in 2000, as well as the attempted kidnapping in December 2005, all went unanswered by Israel and Hizbullah guerrillas were still allowed to maintain their outposts just a stone's throw away from the northern border. This time however, the "Zimmer Policy," according to which Israel turned a blind eye to the Hizbullah buildup as long as the zimmers and hotels in the North were full, was discarded and Israel went to war.
There is no doubt that Israel was completely taken by surprise by the kidnappings of Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser on July 12. Halutz claims that he ordered the Northern Command already back in March to begin preparing for an escalation with Hizbullah in the summer of 2006. In June, the Northern Command held a massive exercise during which it drilled scenarios following the kidnapping of IDF soldiers by Hizbullah, including a massive invasion into Lebanon. Nevertheless, Halutz's call to reserve hotel rooms in the North and Adam's decision to lower the level of alert point in a different direction.
But the lack of intelligence was not the only mistake made throughout the month of fighting in Lebanon. Defense Minister Amir Peretz quickly set up an inquiry commission - led by former chief of staff Lt.-Gen. (res.) Amnon Lipkin-Shahak - to investigate the IDF's management of the war. But that panel has now suspended its work as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert deliberates the establishment of another commission, possibly state-appointed.
These are some of the issues whichever commission is ultimately appointed will have to deal with.

Ground Invasion

While there were many disagreements throughout the entire month of fighting, on a whole, the top IDF brass admit that there has never been such a willing and supportive political echelon as the Ehud Olmert-Amir Peretz duo.
On July 12, several hours after the kidnapping, Halutz went to the cabinet and presented the IDF's air campaign, which included strikes on Beirut's International Airport, as a possible response. To the IDF's surprise, the cabinet immediately approved the plan.
But the air raids quickly exhausted themselves and it became clear that Hizbullah would not be sufficiently weakened by air. Instead, the IDF began launching pinpoint raids into Hizbullah strongholds such as Bint Jbail and Maroun a-Ras along the northern border. Those also proved to be ineffective. Dozens of soldiers were killed and Hizbullah continued to succeed in firing over 100 rockets a day at northern Israel. The next natural step was to launch a larger-scale ground invasion. But something delayed both a ground invasion, and the call-up of reservist forces.

This is where the versions become conflicting. Version A: Adam claims that he was ready at the end of July to launch a widespread ground invasion into Lebanon and that for two weeks troops milled outside Lebanon awaiting orders. Troops inside Lebanon were also frozen in place and, according to frustrated brigade commanders, the lack of movement put the forces on the defensive and gave the upper hand to Hizbullah fighters.
Version B: Sources in the General Staff claim that it was in fact Adam who was hesitant in launching the massive ground operation. He was scared, they said, of the results. There was also Halutz, who for the first three weeks of the war repeated in closed-door meetings that he was opposed to a ground invasion, and that he would only recommend one if there proved to be no alternative. The heavy loss of life in Bint Jbail and Maroun a-Ras also assisted in reducing the support for such an invasion.
Then there is Version C: Olmert's version. He claims that the first time he saw a plan to invade Lebanon with tens of thousands of troops was the day before the plan was approved by the cabinet on August 9. (That contradicts Adam's version that the force was in place already by August 1.)
Factually, Olmert might be telling the truth, and it could be that he only saw the plan on a map laid out on his desk at the Prime Minister's Office on August 8, but he was certainly familiar with such a plan way before then. Indeed, Peretz ordered the IDF on August 3 to begin preparing for a large-scale incursion and an advance to the Litani River - 40 kilometers into Lebanon - in a bid to gain control of Katyusha launch sites.
Logically, the Litani Plan made sense and high-ranking members of the General Staff were already pushing it in the first weeks of war. According to Military Intelligence, close to 70 percent of the rockets raining down on Israel were fired from areas just south and north of the Litani River.
It was in these parts south of the Litani that Hizbullah's elite Nasser Unit was waiting with thousands of troops and functioning command and control centers in underground bunkers, spread out in some 130 villages, laying mines, ambushes and just sitting and waiting for the Israeli tanks to come rolling in. Only a ground presence there, IDF officers claimed, could have curbed the rockets.
But when the push to the Litani finally began, it no longer made much sense due to the looming cease-fire. On Friday August 11, the United Nations Security Council convened and approved a French and American-backed cease-fire resolution. Despite the decision, the IDF pressed forward with its invasion and in some of the fiercest fighting during the war, 12 soldiers and some 80 Hizbullah gunmen were killed as a tank column suffered numerous hits from Hizbullah-fired anti-tank missiles as it tried crossing the Saluki Stream.
This all happened a mere couple of hours after the cease-fire was passed and left soldiers from Armored Brigade 401 wondering what their comrades had died for, considering that IDF officers had said from the outset that the Litani Plan would likely take a week. What was the point of the brief and very bloody operation, those artillery soldiers asked, especially considering that two days after crossing the Saluki, they crossed it again - this time heading home?

Anti-tank missiles

Going into this war, the IDF knew Hizbullah was armed with some of the most advanced anti-tank missiles in existence. Soviet-built Sagger, Cornet and Fagot anti-tank missiles, the French MILAN and the US-built TOW were all known to be in Hizbullah warehouses. What surprised the IDF was the amounts. They seemed at times to be endless. The anti-tank missiles were not only lethal against tanks, as in the battle of the Saluki, but were also effective when fighting against the IDF's infantry forces, such as during the fighting in the village of Dbil, not far from Bint Jbail, where nine reservists were killed August 9 when a building they occupied was hit by missiles and collapsed.
Contrary to public perception, the number of tanks penetrated by missiles was not as high as it originally seemed during the fighting, when the IDF Spokesperson's Office seemed to be constantly updating reporters of another tank hit.
Thousands of anti-tank missiles were indeed fired during the 35 days of fighting, but while soldiers told stories of deadly missile attacks on IDF tanks, Commander of the Armored Corps Brig.-Gen. Halutsi Rudoy told The Jerusalem Post that out of the almost 400 tanks that operated in Lebanon, only a few dozen were hit by anti-tank missiles and only 20 were actually penetrated. In total, 40 tanks were damaged and 30 tank crewmen were killed.
Altogether, the Merkava tank stood up well against the missiles and the explosive devices Hizbullah planted on roads leading to villages in southern Lebanon. No tank, officers explained, is fully resistant to missiles and bombs, but the Merkava did prove the claim that it is one of the most protected tanks in the world.
What these officers take issue with is the Defense Ministry's refusal to push ahead active-protection projects for the tanks, such as the Rafael-developed Trophy system, which is designed to detect and eliminate a missile threat with a launched projectile. The Trophy, senior officers involved in the design of the Merkava tank told The Post, was capable of neutralizing all of the anti-tank rockets in Hizbullah's arsenal.
"Money is what is killing and injuring soldiers," explained a high-ranking officer involved in the development of the Merkava. "The Trophy system is supposed to be there to provide the answer to this threat but due to budget constraints the soldiers are paying the price."

Navy

Off the coast of Beirut everything looks different. The fighting in Lebanon seems distant as the waves lap against missile ships. The war is certainly not at sea.
That is what the Navy thought until the fateful night of July 14 when an Iranian C-802 radar-guided missile struck the INS Hanit patrolling off the coast of Beirut. The Navy is in the midst of an internal investigation into the attack, in which four soldiers were killed, with the main questions surrounding a decision by commanders not to activate the Barak anti-missile system, designed to intercept incoming missiles like the C-802.
Senior officers claimed this week, however, that since that unfortunate incident, the Navy has proven its effectiveness in the war. On July 13, a day after the kidnapping of Goldwasser and Regev, the cabinet instructed the IDF to impose a sea blockade on Lebanon, which will remain in effect, a high-ranking Naval officer estimated this week, possibly for several more months or until a multinational force completes its deployment in southern Lebanon.
Most of the Navy's vessels are participating in the blockade, which is the longest and most extensive operation the Israeli Navy has ever carried out. According to the officer, the decision by the Lebanese government to send the Lebanese army into southern Lebanon for the first time in over 30 years was partially due to the pressure the blockade created.
"The blockade was effective," the high-ranking officer said. "The Lebanese economy is paralyzed and that was our goal."The Navy has since learned its lesson from the Hanit incident and has activated the Barak systems on all its missile ships operating off the Lebanese coast. A commission of inquiry will, however, have to try and answer why the Navy was unaware that Hizbullah possessed such missiles and why the Barak was not fully activated.

IAF

The first 34 minutes of this war were dazzling. IAF fighter jets swept across Lebanon and wiped out in just over half-an-hour most of the guerrilla group's long-range missiles and launchers. In total, over 94 targets were hit, strikes made possible by precise intelligence and perfect execution by well-trained IAF pilots. Those first 34 minutes were characteristic of the IAF's overall contribution to the war in Lebanon.
In total, the IAF few over 15,500 sorties in Lebanon and struck over 7,000 targets. Pictures now emerging from Beirut and other parts of Lebanon show unprecedented destruction, flattened buildings and split roads and bridges. The Air Force was also behind much of the damage caused to Hizbullah infrastructure, especially in the Dahiya stronghold in southern Beirut. F-16 fighter jets repeatedly bombed Hizbullah command and control centers and destroyed some, although not all of them.
But alongside the successes, the IAF also encountered some difficulties throughout the fighting in Lebanon. One such difficulty was the attempt by the Air Force to copy its successful targeted-killing policy from the Gaza Strip to Lebanon.
These attempts were unsuccessful and at one point, a frustrated head of IAF Intelligence, Brig.-Gen. Rami Shmueli, announced during a press briefing that he had ordered his subordinates to stop analyzing Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah's taunting daily televised speeches, implying there was nothing of substance to them. There was also the strike on a bunker in Beirut when a wave of F-16 fighter jets dropped 23 tons on the target after obtaining what turned out to be incorrect intelligence that Nasrallah and other Hizbullah leaders were holed up inside.
The upside to the difficulty in obtaining intelligence, officers explained, was that it caused Israel's three intelligence organizations, Mossad, Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and Military Intelligence, to forgo their "daily ego wars" and to work together during the war in unprecedented harmony.
The IAF's helicopter squadrons also suffered losses throughout the war in three different incidents: One transport helicopter was shot down over Lebanon, two Apache attack helicopters collided midair over northern Israel and another Apache Longbow crashed in Israel under mysterious circumstances, most probably due to a mechanical failure.
There was also the accidental bombing in Kfar Kana in which 28 people, including children, were killed after what now appears to have been an unexploded IAF bomb blew up and destroyed homes in which Lebanese refugees were hiding. The IDF insisted it had warned residents of Kfar Kana of the imminent air strikes and that the village was a launching pad for Katyusha rockets, some of which were fired at northern Israel from the vicinity of the bombed home.
The Kfar Kana incident demonstrated the weak side of Israel's PR machine. The morning of the bombing, every news network in the world connected to the live feed Al-Jazeera was providing from Kfar Kana which showed rescue workers removing the bodies of children from under the rubble. But while Israeli spokespeople claimed that Kfar Kana was a launching pad for Katyusha rockets, they failed to present proof until a military press conference 12 hours later. An earlier presentation of those pictures might have minimized the damage to Israel's reputation. As it was, the damage wrought by the attack convinced US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice that Israel should suspend air activity for 48 hours. Israel acquiesced.

Logistics

This war was definitely the reservists' war. It began with the kidnapping of two reservists in a cross-border Hizbullah attack and continued with the mass recruitment of reservists who fought in Lebanon. In total, 46 reservists were killed during the month of fighting. But while the IDF reported a 100 percent enlistment among reservists, the soldiers who have now taken off their uniforms are complaining of shortages in equipment and entry into battle without proper training.
Possibly one of the greatest disgraces of the war were the shortages in water and food described by reservists. Other soldiers spoke about shortages in equipment. Reservists from the elite Egoz unit were forced to collect donations from abroad after they were sent into battle without flak jackets.
Others spoke about how they were left with no choice but to loot local Lebanese stores. One reservist said he knew beforehand that the IDF would fail to provide for its soldiers and brought US dollars with him, leaving bills in family homes where he and his comrades ate.
Chief IDF Reservist Officer Brig.-Gen. Danny Van-Buren told The Post this week that the military will investigate the run-up to the war and will work to better prepare reservists for future challenges.
"We need to train the reservists more than in the past," Van-Buren said. "We also need to ensure that there is better equipment for reservists and that if they are sent into battle they will be equipped with the best equipment the IDF has."
Responding to reports about reservists who collected money abroad to purchase flak jackets, Van-Buren said: "This is a reality we cannot accept and we need to ensure that our soldiers have everything they need."
The IDF acknowledges that there were glitches in the supply of food, water and equipment to soldiers and reservists but places most of the blame on the current and past governments which over the years have slowly cut away at the defense budget.
"Since we didn't have all the money we wanted, we had to give preferences to soldiers fighting in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank," says head of the IDF Logistics and Medicine Branch Maj.-Gen. Avi Mizrachi. "I wish we had money to buy all the equipment we wanted but when there are budget constraints we need to decide what our preferences are." Apparently, the preferences weren't with the reservists.

A Letter by Einstein and Co.

This is a letter that fell on my lap which was written by famous American Jews including Albert Einstein in the late 1940s. It was written to denounce a visit by Menachem Begin.

Letters to the New York TimesDecember 4, 1948

New Palestine Party Visit of Menachem Begin and Aims of Political Movement Discussed

TO THE EDITORS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:
Among the most disturbing political phenomena of our times is the emergence in the newly created state of Israel of the “Freedom Party” (Tnuat Haherut), a political party closely akin in its organization, methods, political philosophy and social appeal to the Nazi and Fascist parties. It was formed out of the membership and following of the former Irgun Zvai Leumi, a terrorist, right-wing, chauvinist organization in Palestine.
The current visit of Menachem Begin, leader of this party, to the United States is obviously calculated to give the impression of American support for his party in the coming Israeli elections, and to cement political ties with conservative Zionist elements in the United States. Several Americans of national repute have lent their names to welcome his visit. It is inconceivable that those who oppose fascism throughout the world, if correctly informed as to Mr. Begin’s political record and perspectives, could add their names and support to the movement he represents.
Before irreparable damage is done by way of financial contributions, public manifestations in Begin’s behalf, and the creation in Palestine of the impression that a large segment of America supports Fascist elements in Israel, the American public must be informed as to the record and objectives of Mr. Begin and his movement.
The public avowals of Begin’s party are no guide whatever to its actual character. Today they speak of freedom, democracy and anti-imperialism, whereas until recently they openly preached the doctrine of the Fascist state. It is in its actions that the terrorist party betrays its real character; from its past actions we can judge what it may be expected to do in the future.

Attack on Arab Village
A shocking example was their behavior in the Arab village of Deir Yassin. This village, off the main roads and surrounded by Jewish lands, had taken no part in the war, and had even fought off Arab bands who wanted to use the village as their base. On April 9 (THE NEW YORK TIMES), terrorist bands attacked this peaceful village, which was not a military objective in the fighting, killed most of its inhabitants — 240 men, women, and children — and kept a few of them alive to parade as captives through the streets of Jerusalem. Most of the Jewish community was horrified at the deed, and the Jewish Agency sent a telegram of apology to King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan. But the terrorists, far from being ashamed of their act, were proud of this massacre, publicized it widely, and invited all the foreign correspondents present in the country to view the heaped corpses and the general havoc at Deir Yassin.
The Deir Yassin incident exemplifies the character and actions of the Freedom Party.
Within the Jewish community they have preached an admixture of ultranationalism, religious mysticism, and racial superiority. Like other Fascist parties they have been used to break strikes, and have themselves pressed for the destruction of free trade unions. In their stead they have proposed corporate unions on the Italian Fascist model.
During the last years of sporadic anti-British violence, the IZL and Stern groups inaugurated a reign of terror in the Palestine Jewish community. Teachers were beaten up for speaking against them, adults were shot for not letting their children join them. By gangster methods, beatings, window-smashing, and wide-spread robberies, the terrorists intimidated the population and exacted a heavy tribute.
The people of the Freedom Party have had no part in the constructive achievements in Palestine. They have reclaimed no land, built no settlements, and only detracted from the Jewish defense activity. Their much-publicized immigration endeavors were minute, and devoted mainly to bringing in Fascist compatriots.

Discrepancies Seen
The discrepancies between the bold claims now being made by Begin and his party, and their record of past performance in Palestine bear the imprint of no ordinary political party. This is the unmistakable stamp of a Fascist party for whom terrorism (against Jews, Arabs, and British alike), and misrepresentation are means, and a “Leader State” is the goal.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is imperative that the truth about Mr. Begin and his movement be made known in this country. It is all the more tragic that the top leadership of American Zionism has refused to campaign against Begin’s efforts, or even to expose to its own constituents the dangers to Israel from support to Begin.
The undersigned therefore take this means of publicly presenting a few salient facts concerning Begin and his party; and of urging all concerned not to support this latest manifestation of fascism.

(signed)
Isidore Abramowitz, Hannah Arendt, Abraham Brick, Rabbi Jessurun Cardozo, Albert Einstein, Herman Eisen, M.D., Hayim Fineman, M. Gallen, M.D., H.H. Harris, Zelig S. Harris, Sidney Hook, Fred Karush, Bruria Kaufman, Irma L. Lindheim, Nachman Maisel, Symour Melman, Myer D. Mendelson, M.D., Harry M. Orlinsky, Samuel Pitlick, Fritz Rohrlich, Louis P. Rocker, Ruth Sager, Itzhak Sankowsky, I.J. Schoenberg, Samuel Shuman, M. Znger, Irma Wolpe, Stefan Wolpe
New York, Dec. 2, 1948

Post-war Ads

Just to show you some of the post-war adverstisments that have been covering buildings in Beirut. The resilience of Lebanese to continue on living will never be shattered.

UNIFIL with 'teeth'

U.N. Resolution 1701 has authorized up to 15,000 U.N. peacekeepers. Contributions from member nations so far amount to:
-- Italy has agreed to send up to 3,000 troops.
-- France said it will deploy 2,000 troops, including its current 200-member contingent in Lebanon.
-- Finland said it would send up to 250 peacekeepers by November.
-- Germany will not send troops, but will offer naval forces to help patrol the Lebanese coast.
-- Greece has pledged to send naval vessels
-- Netherlands said it would not send troops but may also offer navy a patrol vessel.
-- Spain has reportedly offered between 1,000-1,200 troops.
-- Poland has offered 500 soldiers.
-- Belgium is sending 400 troops, including anti-mine experts, and medical units.
-- Bulgaria said it is willing to send troops, but has not given a number.
-- Turkey has indicated it will contribute troops, but has not given a number.
-- Bangladesh has offered two mechanized battalions with 1,600-2,000 troops. (So far refused by Israel)
-- Indonesia has offered one mechanized battalion and an engineering company totaling about 1,000 troops. (So far refused by Israel)
-- Malaysia pledged one mechanized battalion and Nepal pledged one mechanized infantry battalion, also totaling 1,000 soldiers. (So far refused by Israel)
-- Britain said it would send Jaguar ground attack aircraft and Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, known as Awacs, in addition to a navy frigate. It also offered to help train and equip the Lebanese military and support enhanced command and control technology for the force.
-- The United States said it doesn't plan to participate but does expect to provide logistical assistance to the force.

UNIFIL with 'teeth'
“If, for example, combatants, or those illicitly moving weapons, forcibly resist a demand from them, or from the Lebanese Army, to disarm,” then armed force could be used, Annan said. He added, however, that disarming Hezbollah — a central goal of two United Nations resolutions on Lebanon — “is not going to be done by force.”
The expanded peacekeeping force’s mandate is to support the Lebanese Army in enforcing the resolutions. But disarmament of Hezbollah “has to be achieved through negotiation, and an internal Lebanese consensus, a political process, for which the new Unifil is not, and cannot be, a substitute,” Mr. Annan said. Unifil is the acronym for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

The Killing Goes on

(Above: A cluster bomb from the 1960's. Below: A map of the locations where cluster bombs have been found in South Lebanon)


Israel is being investigated by its fellow ally’s State Department for the illegal use of American-made cluster bombs on south Lebanon. Apparently Israel not only violated the Geneva Convention for using cluster bombs on civilian areas but also secret agreements with the United States that restricts when it can employ such weapons. According to the New York Times, the investigation by the department’s Office of Defense Trade Controls began this week, after reports that three types of American cluster munitions, anti-personnel weapons that spray bomblets over a wide area, have been found in many areas of southern Lebanon and were responsible for civilian casualties, even till today.

The agreements that govern Israel’s use of American cluster munitions go back to the 1970’s, when the first sales of the weapons occurred, but the details of them have never been publicly confirmed. The first one was signed in 1976 and later reaffirmed in 1978 after an Israeli incursion into Lebanon. News accounts over the years have said that they require that the munitions be used only against organized Arab armies and clearly defined military targets under conditions similar to the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973.
A Congressional investigation after Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon found that Israel had used the weapons against civilian areas in violation of the agreements. In response, the Reagan administration imposed a six-year ban on further sales of cluster weapons to Israel.

A report released Wednesday by the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center, which has personnel in Lebanon searching for unexploded ordnance, said it had found unexploded bomblets, including hundreds of American types, in 249 locations south of the Litani River.
The report said American munitions found included 559 M-42’s, an anti-personnel bomblet used in 105-millimeter artillery shells; 663 M-77’s, a submunition found in M-26 rockets; and 5 BLU-63’s, a bomblet found in the CBU-26 cluster bomb. Also found were 608 M-85’s, an Israeli-made submunition.
The unexploded submunitions being found in Lebanon are probably only a fraction of the total number dropped. Cluster munitions can contain dozens or even hundreds of submunitions designed to explode as they scatter around a wide area. They are very effective against rocket-launcher units or ground troops.

In 1982, delivery of cluster-bomb shells to Israel was suspended a month after Israel invaded Lebanon after the Reagan administration determined that Israel “may” have used them against civilian areas. But the decision to impose what amounted to a indefinite moratorium was made under pressure from Congress, which conducted a long investigation of the issue. Israel and the United States reaffirmed restrictions on the use of cluster munitions in 1988, and the Reagan administration lifted the moratorium.

The use of these weapons is hotly opposed by many individuals and groups, such as the Red Cross, the NGO Cluster Munition Coalition and the United Nations, because of the high proportion of civilians that have fallen victim to the weapon. The particular threat this weapon poses to civilians exists for two main reasons. First, because of the weapon's very wide area of effect, accidentally striking both civilian and military objects in the target area is possible. The area affected by a single cluster munition, also known as the footprint, can be as large as two or three football fields. This characteristic of the weapon is particularly problematic for civilians when cluster munitions are used in or near populated areas and has been documented by research reports from groups such as Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action. Secondly, depending on type and their use, between 1% and 40% of the bomblets do not explode on impact. These unexploded ordnance (duds) present a particularly dense and dangerous form of post-conflict contamination and may unintentionally act like anti-personnel land mines (which have been banned in many countries under the Ottawa Treaty) for several years.

Death Tourism

This is probably the most scary advertisement I have ever seen. Israeli officials have been able to turn their "struggle for survival" - as they call it - into a tourism business that costs $1,895 per person excluding airfare. "Experience a dynamic and intensive eight day exploration of Israel's struggle for survival and security in the Middle East today," reads the advertisment (click here to see it). Oh, and mission participants - as they are called - are required to make a tax-deductible donation of $500 to $5,000 to Shurat HaDin - Israel Law Center to assist in the funding of the terror victim litigation against the Palestinian terrorist organizations, their leaders and financial patrons. I think it is rather ludicrous to transform such serious situations into a fantasy business that does only one thing: instigate more hate and fear.
One of the testimonials read: "Whether it was observing a terror trial outside Beit El, cruising the Kinneret in the beautiful moonlight, staring down Hizzboulah terrorists across the Lebanese border, or meeting the key policy makers and shapers in Israel, each stop on the odyssey connected me more and more to the tribulations and triumphs of our amazing Israeli brothers and sisters." It feels great that another person now clearly views all of Lebanon as a terrorist organization. Thank you Shurat HaDin for turning the region's crisis into a Disney Middle East where people don't even see that human beings are dying in the thousands, on all sides.
mrtez

The itenerary includes:
- Briefings by Mossad officials and Shin Bet commanders.
- Briefing by officers in the IDF Intelligence and Operations branches.
- Inside tour of the IAF unit who carries out targeted killings.
- Live exhabition of penetration raids in Arab territory.
- Observe a trial of Hamas terrorists in an IDF military court.
- First hand tours of the Lebanese front-line military positions and the Gaza border check-points.
- Inside tour of the controversial Security Fence and secret intelligence bases.
- Meeting Israel's Arab agents who infiltrate the terrorist groups and provide real-time intelligence.
- Briefing by Israel's war heros who saved the country.
- Meetings with senior Cabinet Ministers and other key policymakers.
- Small airplane tour of the Galilee, Jeep rides in the Golan hights, water activities on Lake Kinneret, a cookout barbecue and a Shabbat enjoying the rich religious and historic wonders of Jerusalem's Old City.

The Aftermath? Maybe not

The war between Israel and Hizbollah might be over for now, but a new war within Lebanon has just started. We are facing mountains of problems from all sides - be it economically, socially, politically or enviromentally.
Economically the country has lost in total over $15 billion according to a UNDP estimate, out of which $3.6 billion accounts for direct physical damage. All of the 15-years of reconstruction we were so proud of are gone to waste in one month. And add to that the problem of our public debt - which equals over 180% of the GDP or $40 billion - and the situation becomes very strenuous. Hopefully, the donor conference to be held in Sweden on 31st August will raise enough money to pull Lebanon out of an imminent financial and economic disaster.
Socially, the Israeli/Hizbollah war has clearly divided the Lebanese people – the Shias on one side and everyone else on the other (read article below). This new situation can become very dangerous in a country where people are loyal to their sects. If flared up by any miniscule event, the divisions could transform into civil strife – a condition which no one desires in Lebanon.
Politically, apart from the internal divisions between Hizbollah and the rest of the parties, the country is still under a constant blockade by Israel. All planes departing or landing in Rafik Hariri International Airport have to make a forced stop-over in Amman to be searched by Israeli officials. And not a single boat can enter or leave the country. Such a blockade is making the situation much more difficult for anyone to enter into internal dialogue since the country’s sovereignty is still under attack.
Enviromentally our sea shores are completely devestated. Some 15,000 tons of fuel oil have leaked from the Jiyeh Power plant polluting over 150 kilometers of the Lebanese coast - a catastrophe which is beggining to be compared to the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill that devestated Alaska's Prince William Sound. Plans for clean-up are already being sketched out but apparently the operation would take nearly a year to complete and cost some $64 million.

And the worst part is that a lot of people still don’t believe the war is over. It might be for now, but some don’t think for long: “A frightening side to this long-term promise for believers in the UN ceasefire is that Hizbollah has encouraged its Shia population to rent homes in Khalde, south of Beirut, since it intends to delay its entire city construction project for a year - because of its conviction that the ceasefire will break down and that another Israeli-Hizbollah war will only wreck newly built homes.” This was written by Robert Fisk on the 24th of August 2006 (click here to read the article).
mrtez

Rifts over Hizbullah form Lebanon's new green line
Declan Walsh in Beirut
Thursday August 24, 2006
The Guardian

Only in Beirut do war scars and champagne chic blend so easily. In Achrafiye, an upmarket district of hip restaurants and nightclubs where a bottle of bubbly can cost $1,000, a ravaged building totters over a street corner.
Bullet holes pock the walls and the windows have long disappeared. Rubbish and barbed wire clog the front door and weeds sprout from the upper floors. The lonely ruin is what remains of the Green Line, the infamous boundary that divided Christian East and Muslim West Beirut during the 17-year-old civil war of the 1970s and 80s. Until recently it was a reminder of a bitter conflict most Lebanese thought was over. But since this summer's 34-day war with Israel, there are fears of fresh divisions within Lebanese society that could heave the country into a new era of turmoil.
The new green line wobbles uncertainly around the role of Hizbullah. As Israeli warplanes pulverised Lebanon's infrastructure and laid entire villages to waste, many Lebanese silently rallied around the fighters' resistance. But since a ceasefire took hold 11 days ago, sectarian dissent has slowly swelled.
Druze, Sunni and some Christian leaders blame Hizbullah for provoking Israel and are demanding the group submit to the national government. "The [political] situation has become dramatically worse since July 12," said Michael Young, opinion page editor at the Daily Star newspaper. "The perception among non-Shia communities is that Hizbullah went to war without consulting with anyone."
Some quietly suggest Israel should have gone further to crush the militant group. "I wish with all my heart this war had not ended," one Christian woman, who asked not to be named, said in the southern city of Tyre.
An exception is the Christian leader Michel Aoun, who has forged an alliance with Hizbullah in what he depicts as an effort to build bridges with Muslims. But this is controversial among other Christians, who say Hizbullah has let countries such as Syria and Iran use Lebanon as a battleground for their interests.
The fiercest argument centres on disarmament. Israel, the US and the UN say Hizbullah must surrender its arms to ensure peace. "To play a patriotic role they don't need weapons," said Elias Attallah of the Democratic Left party. "An army and a resistance movement cannot live side by side. In Lebanon no community can accept domination by another. Otherwise it will lead to war."
Others say such demands may be incendiary. "If the government persists in trying to disarm Hizbullah and if the US keeps pushing them, this will create sectarian tensions, a split in the army, and could very well lead to a civil war," said Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, a lecturer at the American University of Beirut who has written a book on Hizbullah.
Among its Shia supporters, at least, Hizbullah is riding a wave of popularity. In Beirut yesterday officials handed out thick wads of US dollars to war refugees whose houses had been destroyed. The funding is widely believed to come from oil-rich Iran, Hizbullah's main sponsor.
Musa Trablisi, 57, slipped $12,000 (£6,340) into his pocket, the maximum under Hizbullah's compensation system. His house in Ainata near the Israeli border has been flattened, he said. Even so, his loyalties were clear. "As long as Israel attacks and bombs our country, and as long as our government is paralysed, I am with Hizbullah," he said.
One solution could be to rejig Lebanon's political structures. Under the country's sectarian power-sharing system, based on a 1932 census, Shia are under-represented in the government, civil service and top ranks of the army.
But efforts to reach an internal settlement are constantly buffeted by outside forces. Some feel Lebanon's future lies in the hands of powerbrokers in Washington, Tehran and Damascus. "Geographically we are in the wrong place, like Poland during world war two," said Khaled Daouk, a Sunni businessman.

War Crimes

Amnesty International released its report on the war in Lebanon in which it clearly condemns the Israeli aggression as war crimes. It states that Israel deliberatly targeted civilians and the country's infrastructure as part of its military strategy. Israel's statement that it was targeting Hizbollah who were using civilians as human shields "rings hollow," stated the respected organization. It's time that IDF stops acting as a bully and starts abiding by the Geneva Convention. Why did Israel target a milk factory for example? RS visited the bombed site in the Bekaa yesterday and he will update you on that soon. Some sources claim that the Lebanese milk factory had won a profitable EU contract recently, beating an Israeli milk factory who came in second place. If this is true or untrue, the question still holds: why a milk factory?
Here is an extract of the report by Amnesty International, entitled: Lebanon: Deliberate destruction or "collateral damage"? Israeli attacks on civilian infrastructure.

Deliberate destruction or ‘collateral damage’?
During more than four weeks of ground and aerial bombardment of Lebanon by the Israeli armed forces, the country’s infrastructure suffered destruction on a catastrophic scale. Israeli forces pounded buildings into the ground, reducing entire neighbourhoods to rubble and turning villages and towns into ghost towns, as their inhabitants fled the bombardments. Main roads, bridges and petrol stations were blown to bits. Entire families were killed in air strikes on their homes or in their vehicles while fleeing the aerial assaults on their villages. Scores lay buried beneath the rubble of their houses for weeks, as the Red Cross and other rescue workers were prevented from accessing the areas by continuing Israeli strikes. The hundreds of thousands of Lebanese who fled the bombardment now face the danger of unexploded munitions as they head home.

The Israeli Air Force launched more than 7,000 air attacks on about 7,000 targets in Lebanon between 12 July and 14 August, while the Navy conducted an additional 2,500 bombardments.(1) The attacks, though widespread, particularly concentrated on certain areas. In addition to the human toll – an estimated 1,183 fatalities, about one third of whom have been children(2), 4,054 people injured and 970,000Lebanese people displaced(3) – the civilian infrastructure was severely damaged. The Lebanese government estimates that 31 "vital points" (such as airports, ports, water and sewage treatment plants, electrical facilities) have been completely or partially destroyed, as have around 80 bridges and 94 roads.(4) More than 25 fuel stations(5) and around 900 commercial enterprises were hit. The number of residential properties, offices and shops completely destroyed exceeds 30,000.(6) Two government hospitals – in Bint Jbeil and in Meis al-Jebel – were completely destroyed in Israeli attacks and three others were seriously damaged.(7)

In a country of fewer than four million inhabitants, more than 25 per cent of them took to the roads as displaced persons. An estimated 500,000 people sought shelter in Beirut alone, many of them in parks and public spaces, without water or washing facilities.
Amnesty International delegates in south Lebanon reported that in village after village the pattern was similar: the streets, especially main streets, were scarred with artillery craters along their length. In some cases cluster bomb impacts were identified. Houses were singled out for precision-guided missile attack and were destroyed, totally or partially, as a result. Business premises such as supermarkets or food stores and auto service stations and petrol stations were targeted, often with precision-guided munitions and artillery that started fires and destroyed their contents. With the electricity cut off and food and other supplies not coming into the villages, the destruction of supermarkets and petrol stations played a crucial role in forcing local residents to leave. The lack of fuel also stopped residents from getting water, as water pumps require electricity or fuel-fed generators.

Israeli government spokespeople have insisted that they were targeting Hizbullah positions and support facilities, and that damage to civilian infrastructure was incidental or resulted from Hizbullah using the civilian population as a "human shield". However, the pattern and scope of the attacks, as well as the number of civilian casualties and the amount of damage sustained, makes the justification ring hollow. The evidence strongly suggests that the extensive destruction of public works, power systems, civilian homes and industry was deliberate and an integral part of the military strategy, rather than "collateral damage" – incidental damage to civilians or civilian property resulting from targeting military objectives.

Statements by Israeli military officials seem to confirm that the destruction of the infrastructure was indeed a goal of the military campaign. On 13 July, shortly after the air strikes began, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) Chief of Staff Lt-Gen Dan Halutz noted that all Beirut could be included among the targets if Hizbullah rockets continued to hit northern Israel: "Nothing is safe [in Lebanon], as simple as that,"(8) he said. Three days later, according to the Jerusalem Post newspaper, a high ranking IDF officer threatened that Israel would destroy Lebanese power plants if Hizbullah fired long-range missiles at strategic installations in northern Israel.(9) On 24 July, at a briefing by a high-ranking Israeli Air Force officer, reporters were told that the IDF Chief of Staff had ordered the military to destroy 10 buildings in Beirut for every Katyusha rocket strike on Haifa.(10) His comments were later condemned by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel.(11) According to the New York Times, the IDF Chief of Staff said the air strikes were aimed at keeping pressure on Lebanese officials, and delivering a message to the Lebanese government that they must take responsibility for Hizbullah’s actions. He called Hizbullah "a cancer" that Lebanon must get rid of, "because if they don’t their country will pay a very high price." (12)

The widespread destruction of apartments, houses, electricity and water services, roads, bridges, factories and ports, in addition to several statements by Israeli officials, suggests a policy of punishing both the Lebanese government and the civilian population in an effort to get them to turn against Hizbullah. Israeli attacks did not diminish, nor did their pattern appear to change, even when it became clear that the victims of the bombardment were predominantly civilians, which was the case from the first days of the conflict.

For the full report click here.

Brothers in Arms?

(The above flag is that of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards; the lower of Hezbollah)

Even though we all know that Hezbollah is trained and equipped by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, it is rather surprising to see the shocking resemblance in their flags. Apart for the colors and the Arabic writing, the rest of the flag (hand, weapon, globe and leaf) are exactly the same.
Hezbollah is such a highly trained guerilla force, that it is now compared to the special forces of the Revolutionary Guards. Any thoughts on this close-partnership?

Above the Clouds

This week-end we were above the clouds in Faqra resort (as seen in pic). RS and I, along with a member of another blog (arabisraelipeace.blogspot.com) decided we needed a really relaxing time-off from the city, the news and the politics. What better way then to head to the peaceful mountain resort where there is no humidity or heat. It was perfect timing as the war was over and we really deserved some quiet from the 30+ day nightmare we lived through continously.
But it was too good to be true. As soon as we arrived Friday evening to the stunning mountain resort, all we could hear were jet fighters and helicopters flying right above our heads. It was so loud we couldn't believe it was the Israelis. But it was. At that specific moment, the IAF was conducting mock up attacks on the city of Baalbeck, some 30-kilometers from our location. And a couple of hours later, IDF commandos landed in the same area and performed ground operations, over 100-km from the Israeli-Lebanese border. This was a major breach of the cease-fire agreement. I wonder what the Israeli government has planned for what it called "the next round" against Hizbullah.
Maybe we were wrong to dream that the war would be over...

No time to waste, time to reconstruct

(Clean up crew in Dahieh)

Only a couple days since the end of the war and people have already focused their efforts on reconstructing the country and aiding the people who have no more homes. Hizbollah is already donating some US$15,000 to every person who has lost their homes. Prominent businessmen and private companies have already pledged money to reconstruct 12 bridges. The government is already surveying all the damages incurred and is getting ready to present its needs at an international conference expected to be held in Sweden on 31st August. Even airlines are planning to fly back into Beirut International Airport shortly, with MEA landing today and British Airways flying in early next week.
Our country shall never bend down and we shall show to the world what the word Lebanon really means.
However, it seems not everyone is very glad about the reconstruction conference Sweden will be hosting for Lebanon. The Simon Wiesenthal Center, an anti-Semitism awareness group, on Wednesday slammed Sweden's plans to host an international aid conference for Lebanon as "discriminatory", saying the meeting should also address the needs of Israeli victims of the conflict. A statement issued by the Wiesenthal Centre accused the Swedish government of "exclusion and discrimination". Last I checked, not only is our country completely devestated by Israeli air raids, but we also recieve absolutley no yearly aid from America. If I am not mistaken, every single bridge, road, power plant, airport, factory, telecommunication center, water treatment plant in Israel is intact. If I am not mistaken there was absolutely no blockade in Israel. How is a Lebanon aid conference "discriminatory"? And please Wiesenthal Centre don't call us anti-semite, we all are semites here.

Hizbollah’s Outlook in the Current Conflict (Part II)

Here is the second part of the fascinating insight of Hizbollah and what their strategy could look like in post-war Lebanon. Enjoy the rare and unique read. You can find both articles on www.carnegieendowment.org in PDF format or here at Beirut Live.

Part Two: Accommodating Diplomacy and Preparing for the Postwar Context
By Amal Saad-Ghorayeb

The adoption of United Nations Resolution 1701 and a formal cease-fire raise hopes for peace in Lebanon. Yet many questions exist about the viability of the settlement, questions whose answers will depend significantly on Hizbollah’s outlook, both about the diplomacy that has taken place as well as its own position in Lebanon coming out of the current conflict. The issue of Hizbollah’s disarmament remains a powerful potential logjam, one that could result in continued strife, either between Israel and Lebanon, or within Lebanon itself.

Partial Accommodation to the Lebanese Government’s Initial Diplomatic Stance Hizbollah consistently called for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire to the fighting that started after July 12—or as Hizbollah termed it: “an immediate end to Israeli aggression.” The party was opposed to the principle of a conditional cease-fire as part of larger peace package. As explained by Mohammed Fneish, Hizbollah’s Energy Minister, “the discussion of a comprehensive solution is in our opinion a cover for the aggression and allows the United States to appear as though it is making an effort at a time when it was waging war on us.”
Despite these objections, the party leadership assented to the seven-point comprehensive cease-fire plan put forward by the Lebanese Prime Minister, Fuad Siniora, soon after the conflict began. Hizbollah’s two ministers expressed reservations about the various elements of the plan, but the party felt compelled to agree to it for the sake of a common Lebanese front. According to Fneish, who took part in the cabinet deliberations, Hizbollah endorsed Siniora’s proposal “to prevent transforming our battle with Israel into a domestic battle, and to avoid being accused of hindering efforts which could have reduced losses for Lebanon.”

In another sign of accommodation with the Siniora government, Hizbollah ministers approved a Lebanese cabinet decision in the first week of August to mobilize 15,000 Lebanese army troops for deployment to the south in the event of a cease-fire and an Israeli withdrawal. Attempting to justify this move to the party’s rank and file, Hizbollah’s Secretary General, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, commended the cabinet’s decision as an act that would “greatly help Lebanon and its friends to press for amending the draft resolution which is being prepared at the Security Council.”

Skepticism about UN Resolution 1701
Despite Nasrallah’s espousal of a political resolution to the crisis, Hizbollah remains wary of diplomatic initiatives by the international community and harbors a particular mistrust of the UN Security Council. This mistrust is evidenced by Nasrallah’s characterization of Resolution 1701 as “unfair and unjust” for absolving Israel of its “war crimes and massacres” while holding Hizbollah “responsible for starting the aggression.” Throughout the conflict, Hizbollah repeatedly rejected any “humiliating conditions” being imposed upon it or Lebanon, regardless of “how long the confrontation lasts” or “how numerous the sacrifices may be.” In this vein, Nasrallah urged the government on several occasions, including in a speech on August 9, to remain “steadfast” and not acquiesce to American- Israeli demands in the negotiation process.

Despite Hizbollah’s criticisms, Resolution 1701 constitutes at least a partial diplomatic victory for the group insofar as it was an improvement (from Hizbollah’s perspective) on previous drafts that were rejected by both Hizbollah and the Lebanese government. As Nasrallah puts it, the end result was “the least bad” of all the drafts. Hizbollah would therefore “not be an obstacle to any decision taken by the Lebanese government” and would “abide by” any cease-fire agreement worked out by the UN Secretary General “without hesitation.” The resolution was approved by the Lebanese cabinet on August 12 and, by extension, by Hizbollah’s ministers, although they voiced a number of reservations.

Prospects for a Cessation of Hostilities
Resolution 1701 calls for a “full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations,” after which the Lebanese government and reinforced up United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) forces are to deploy in the South, while Israeli troops withdraw “in parallel.” The implementation of this process is certain to be highly complicated and face a significant risk of failure.
Although both the Lebanese and Israeli governments acceded to Secretary General Kofi Annan’s call for a cessation of hostilities effective August 14, it is very possible that fighting will continue after that date, for two interrelated reasons: first, Israel is refusing to withdraw from Lebanon until international and Lebanese troops deploy; and second, Hizbollah intends to continue fighting as long as Israeli soldiers remain on Lebanese soil, as Nasrallah spelled out explicitly on August 12. This leaves an interim period of an estimated one to two weeks before UNIFIL troops are expected to arrive, during which the fighting is likely to flare up again.

Hizbollah’s First Clash with the Lebanese Government over Disarmament
In line with the Lebanese government’s seven-point plan, Resolution 1701 stipulates that the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River be manned solely by 15,000 troops each from the Lebanese army and UNIFIL. Although the UNIFIL force has not been granted peace-enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it will have the right to “resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties.”
As noted above, Hizbollah agreed to this arrangement when it approved the government’s seven-point plan. Hizbollah made this concession relying on the solid relationship it had developed with the approximately 1,000 Lebanese army troops stationed close to the southern border area since the Israeli pullout in 2000, and the similar modus vivendi it achieved with the 2,000 UNIFIL forces stationed there since the early 1980s. Hizbollah also assumed that the Lebanese army’s role would be to secure Lebanon’s border, not Israel’s, as demonstrated both by Nasrallah’s recent assertion that the Lebanese army “are not forces that take orders from enemies” and Fneish’s assessment that “the army’s role would not be to protect Israel and it wouldn’t deploy according to Israel’s security needs.”

Hizbollah did not equate the Lebanese army’s deployment with its own disarmament and hence saw no potential clash between its armed forces and the army. This assumption was reinforced by there being nothing in the cabinet-approved plan explicitly suggesting that Hizbollah would be expected to disarm. Moreover, the fact that Resolution 1701 does not resolve the dispute over Shebaa Farms (the Secretary General is to present a proposal on this issue to the Security Council within 30 days of the date of the resolution) also gave Hizbollah what it viewed as further assurance that the Lebanese government would accede to its maintaining arms. A source with close links to the party suggested in a recent interview that Hizbollah was relatively confident that the government would be bound to its policy statement of July 2005, which clearly legitimized Hizbollah’s “right” to “complete the liberation of Lebanese territories,” meaning Shebaa. Hizbollah clearly envisaged an arms management as opposed to an arms decommissioning scenario whereby its arms would remain hidden, and hence deactivated, save for occasional attacks on the occupied Shebaa Farms area, which could be launched from its bases behind the Litani River.

These assumptions were shaken on August 13, however, in the immediate aftermath of the issuance of Resolution 1701 when cabinet members of the ruling majority called for a special session to deliberate on Hizbollah’s disarmament preceding the deployment of the Lebanese army and UNIFIL. Hizbollah’s ministers refused to discuss the prospect of disarmament at the current time, for various reasons, including that Shebaa’s status would remain unresolved for another month. According to a source close to the Lebanese army command, the army command refuses to dispatch troops to the south if their mandate is rejected by Hizbollah.
Such a decision is not surprising given that an estimated 40 per cent of army conscripts are Shiites, while the army is known to be sympathetic to Hizbollah and enjoys good relations with Hizbollah’s military command. Moreover, it is likely that the army is keen to avoid a split in its ranks as has occurred in the past. Whatever the outcome of this deadlock might be, it is bound to complicate efforts to dispatch international forces to the area, while the political polarization underlying the deadlock may intensify in the near future.

Hizbollah’s Broader Rejection of Disarmament
Resolution 1701 reiterates the need to implement Resolutions 1559 and 1680, which call for the disarmament of Hizbollah (without mentioning Hizbollah by name), as part of a comprehensive and permanent cease-fire plan. In order to better appreciate the difficulties inherent in any effort to disarm Hizbollah in a postwar scenario, an examination of the party’s motives for maintaining its arms and refusing the integration of its military forces into the army is needed.
Most campaigns for Hizbollah’s disarmament are premised on the argument that a sovereign democratic state has to possess a monopoly over the use of force. Although Hizbollah has failed to publicly articulate an intellectually coherent counter-argument to these calls, party officials have attempted through various statements to justify Hizbollah’s armed status, including in interviews conducted by the author in June of this year.

According to Fneish, “the resistance did not emerge when the state was strong and in a position to protect its borders; it did not cause the weakness of the state. The resistance emerged because the state was already weak, it came because the state failed.” He adds that had it not been for the armed resistance, and the liberation of Lebanon from Israeli occupation, there would have been “no return of the state to the south.” In this view, the state lacked sovereignty because of successive Israeli invasions and occupations, not because of Hizbollah’s arms. Had the state assumed its role as a sovereign power and evicted Israel from its territory, there would have been no need for the resistance. Ali Fayyad, Politburo member and director of a think tank closely affiliated with Hizbollah, adopts a similarly utilitarian argument: “Society is more important than the state because the state is meant to serve society … when the state fails in carrying out some of its functions, society must help the state in carrying them out, even if the state doesn’t ask.” Thus, although Hizbollah officials agree “in theory” that a state must have a monopoly on the use of force, in practice they do not. In the words of Fneish, “confronting the danger to the country’s destiny is more important than the theoretical incompatibility of such means with the state’s authority.”

But this incompatibility is more than just theoretical for many critics of Hizbollah who see the organization as constituting a “state within a state.” In light of this, various proposals have been floated, which center on integrating the Hizbollah’s military capacity into the Lebanese army, such as one put forth by Terje Roed-Larsen, special UN Envoy for Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559 on Lebanon. Asked in a June interview what he thought of Roed-Larsen’s proposal, Sheikh Nai’m Qassem, Hizbollah’s Deputy Secretary General, asserted that it “appears to be a solution but in essence, its aim is to eliminate the resistance,” and for that reason, its implementation was “out of the question.”

In May, Nasrallah publicly ruled out such a merger as well, arguing that “it is not a realistic option because this will weaken the Lebanese position in facing the much superior Israeli army.” He contended that even if the army had the needed manpower and budget to bolster its forces, the United States and other Western powers would not agree “to sell us qualitative arms that would guarantee air cover for the army.” Given these obstacles, Hizbollah’s armed forces are the only way of creating a “balance of power” with the Israeli Defense Forces.

Hizbollah asserts other grounds for objecting to the integration of its armed forces into the army. One such argument is that the “margin between the Resistance and army” is of benefit to the state insofar as it does not have to bear direct responsibility for any of the resistance’s activities. As Nasrallah pointed out earlier this year, “when any resistance under the army fires a single bullet, then the ministry of defense … and the entire state would be subject to direct attack.” For these and other reasons, Hizbollah offers few concessions on its arms other than “coordination without integration.” The farthest Hizbollah officials have gone is to suggest that Hizbollah’s armed forces would become a “reserve army,” which would coordinate with the Lebanese army on matters of strategy but not tactics. However, this would amount to little more than “calling resistance by another name,” to use Qassem’s terminology, given that Hizbollah’s military activities would remain under its own command.

It follows from this that Hizbollah is not willing to disarm in the foreseeable future. As Nasrallah has spelled out on several occasions, the party will remain armed for “as long as Israel remains a threat to the country.” In a speech earlier this year, Nasrallah suggested that only a “comprehensive settlement which would bring an end to the war” could neutralize that threat. From Hizbollah’s perspective, the security of Lebanon remains inextricably tied to the Arab-Israeli conflict, regardless of Israel’s fulfillment of specific Lebanese demands. Fneish articulates this view in stating that, “the problem wouldn’t be solved if Israel simply withdraws from Lebanon,” but would continue until a just and comprehensive regional agreement is in the offing. For Qassem, “when Palestinians are being killed on a daily basis on our very doorstep and when 300,000 or 400,000 Palestinians remain in Lebanon and cannot return to their country … this is aggression.” Asked to specify the exact conditions under which Hizbollah would no longer view Israel as a threat and contemplate disarmament, Qassem answers, “let’s not talk about the reaction but the action…. If the Israeli danger disappears one day and I have no idea how it would disappear, then the resistance which was a reaction to the Israeli danger would no longer be present. The struggle is therefore open so long as Israel is aggressive in its presence and existence.”

Hizbollah officials have insinuated on various occasions that the party might hold on to its arms indefinitely due to what it perceives as the perpetual threat posed by Israel. For example, Nasrallah described Israel as a “permanent threat which could turn into aggression at any time,” in the same breath as his utterances on a comprehensive settlement. In perhaps one of the clearest indications of Hizbollah’s view of the nature of the Israeli threat and hence Hizbollah’s determination to retain its arms, Qassem affirmed as recently as two months ago that, “our opinion is that Israel’s existence itself is a danger. Because the origins of Israel lie in the occupation of land and the violation of others’ rights. This is aggression. Every single experience we have had since 1948 until now is an experience of aggression, expansion, wars and displacement, imprisonment and killing. Parts of four countries were occupied under the banner of Israel’s existence.”

Hizbollah’s Postwar Plans
In the view of many observers inside and outside the region, including some in Israel, Hizbollah has effectively emerged as the military victor in this war by having survived and by inflicting losses against Israel throughout the conflict. Some Lebanese politicians representing the “March 14” political camp, as well as many non-Shiite Lebanese, have voiced fears about the political implications of a victorious Hizbollah. In an attempt to allay such concerns last month, Nasrallah responded: “I conclusively answer by saying, first of all, Lebanon and its people had an experience with how this resistance acted after the victory in 2000. Second, I assert from now on that victory will be for all of Lebanon.” The Hizbollah leader was referring to similar fears that were expressed in the aftermath of Hizbollah’s liberation of south Lebanon from Israeli occupation in 2000. As elaborated by Hizbollah Politburo member Ghaleb Abou-Zeynab, “the fear is that Hizbollah would change the entire political equation if it triumphs to eliminate others. There will be political changes but we have no intention of destabilizing the situation.”

These “political changes” that Hizbollah envisions are two-fold. The first relates to Lebanon’s political identity and foreign allegiances. Nasrallah alluded to the desired change when he recently urged the government “not to forget” how the U.S. administration failed it in its time of need, and cautioned those who continue to count on U.S. support. In an expansion of this stance, Abou-Zeynab claimed that those “who had previously relied on the outside for their policies or U.S. support for change, now have to rethink this in light of the new reality.” Hizbollah is making an assertive claim to Lebanon’s political identity, as exemplified by Abou Zeynab’s statement that, “Lebanon will be removed from the U.S.-French orbit.” By the same token, Nasrallah has vowed that “Lebanon will not be one of the locations of the ‘new Middle East.’”

The second change concerns a new hardening on disarmament. Now that Hizbollah has shown that Israel’s powerful, U.S.-backed military was unable to disarm it, it believes that nobody else can, least of all the weakened Lebanese government. Qomati boldly declared that the “resistance is a red line for us, handing [in] our arms is out of the question, even if Shebaa is liberated.” This view is likely shared among the approximately 96 percent (according to a poll carried out in Lebanon last month) of Lebanon’s Shiites who support Hizbollah. The hundreds of thousands of Shiites who have been displaced from predominantly Shiite areas are likely to be more united as a community, as well as angry and radicalized vis-à-vis Israel, and thus even more favorable to Hizbollah maintaining arms than in the past.

In light of these facts, the consequences might be dire if the Lebanese government ardently pursues the disarmament of Hizbollah. In the worst case scenario, civil strife would occur and the state would collapse. In the best case, all Shiite ministers would withdraw from the cabinet, leading to the government’s collapse. Ultimately, the ruling majority is likely to be faced with a troubling dilemma: either a state within a state or a state within a failed state.

Amal Saad-Ghorayeb is an assistant professor at the Lebanese American University in Beirut. She writes regularly on Lebanese politics and is the author of Hizbullah: Politics and Religion

Hizbollah’s Outlook in the Current Conflict

A fascinating read into the mind of the Hizbollah. We will soon publish Part Two of the research entitled "Accommodating Diplomacy and Preparing for the Post-War Context". Stay tuned...

Part One: Motives, Strategy, and Objectives
By Amal Saad-Ghorayeb

The fighting between Israel and Hizbollah has reached a critical juncture given Israel’s widening ground offensive and the heated negotiations over an impending UN Security Council resolution to end the conflict. Israel’s war on Hizbollah has catapulted the movement onto the world stage, earned it widespread respect throughout the Arab and Islamic world, and hardened its support in Lebanon. Understanding Hizbollah’s outlook both with regard to the onset of the current conflict as well as its strategic objectives is crucial to assessing the likely course of events in the crucial weeks ahead.

Hizbollah’s July 12 Ambush: Motives and Expectations Concerning an Israeli Response
After Israel’s massive response to Hizbollah’s July 12 ambush of an Israeli convoy, many commentators and ordinary Lebanese concluded that Hizbollah’s decision to carry out the attack was either an Iranian-issued and Syrian-encouraged directive, aimed at igniting a war with Israel and dragging Lebanon into a wider regional conflict, or a reckless miscalculation that unwittingly wreaked havoc on the country.

The fundamental flaw in the first interpretation is that it does not take into account Hizbollah’s similar abductions in the past which paved the way for prisoner exchanges with Israel involving hundreds of Lebanese and other Arab prisoners. Moreover, the party had dubbed 2006 “the year of the prisoners” (referring to the three Lebanese detainees whom Israel refused to release in the larger prisoner exchange of 2004) and did in fact attempt to capture Israeli soldiers in the preceding months for that very purpose. In Hizbollah’s view, therefore, the abductions did not constitute a paradigm shift in its military strategy that necessitated an Iranian stamp of approval or warranted a massive Israeli response. From Hizbollah’s perspective, the fact that Israeli soldiers were captured from Israel proper on July 12 did not represent a significant change in the rules of the game given Israel’s routine violations of the Blue Line separating Israel from Lebanon. It is in light of these considerations that Hizbollah claims it anticipated a more customary Israeli response to abductions: limited aggression, to be followed by a prisoner exchange. As admitted by the deputy-head of the party’s Politburo, Mahmoud Qomati, Hizbollah “did not expect the response would be of this magnitude.”

This acknowledgement may appear to corroborate the second interpretation. It would be an
oversimplification, however, to take Hizbollah’s admission of not forecasting such a military escalation as evidence of sheer miscalculation. Judging by Hizbollah’s ability to absorb the shock of Israel’s immense air power, its impressive performance in ground battles, and its sustained ability to launch rockets at Israeli towns and cities, Hizbollah does not appear to have been taken completely off guard by Israel’s offensive. It is likely that the party had envisaged a large-scale Israeli response as one of many possible scenarios—though perhaps not giving it as much weight as others—and had therefore laid out the necessary contingency plans. As articulated by Hizbollah’s Energy Minister, Mohammed Fneish, “when we make a decision we lay out plans for what the Israeli response might be, even the worst possibilities, and we are ready for them. We base our decisions on the worst possible outcomes.”

In fact, there is evidence suggesting that Hizbollah must have foreseen an existential showdown with Israel at some point in the short to medium term. Before the outbreak of the conflict, the party had been engaged in the Lebanon National Dialogue talks, which deliberated over, among other issues, the fate of Hizbollah’s arms under the aegis of proposals for a “National Defense Strategy.” Some political forces belonging to the “March 14” Lebanese parliamentary majority, which enjoys close ties with the United States and France, had used these talks as an effort to implement the U.S.-French brokered UNSC Resolution 1559, which calls for Hizbollah’s disarmament. According to Qomati, the party was fully aware that the talks were heading toward deadlock and believed the result would be that the United States would try to implement Resolution 1559 by means of an Israeli military assault on Hizbollah. In effect, Hizbollah was “prepared but not for the timing of the operation.”

Hizbollah’s Secretary-General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, announced in July that the party had recently learned that the offensive had been planned for this September or October and that as such, it was fortuitous Hizbollah abducted the Israeli soldiers when it did: doing so hastened the war and hence deprived Israel of the “element of surprise.” Qomati cites the Bush administration’s consistent rejection of an immediate cease-fire as proof that the United States is orchestrating the war and that it would have been waged regardless of the abductions. Hizbollah has thus gone beyond its conventional view of the United States’ role as one of post-facto justification and legitimatization of Israeli actions, and now perceives Washington as the primary engineer of Israel’s current onslaught. Talk by U.S. officials of turning the Lebanon crisis into an “opportunity” to forge a “New Middle East,” coupled with the Bush administration’s adamant refusal to accept anything less than the “conditions for a sustainable cease-fire,” are interpreted by Hizbollah as U.S. dictates for both the instigation and prolongation of the current conflict. As expounded by Nasrallah in a speech last month, “the Israelis are ready for stopping the aggression….it is the United States which insists on continuing the aggression on Lebanon.” In this connection, Israel is now seen as an “obedient tool” of a U.S. policy that seeks to redraw the political map of the region beginning with Lebanon and working its way through to Iran and Syria.Given these factors, Hizbollah frames the current conflict as one waged by the United States and Israel against it, thereby, in its view, rendering its military objectives entirely defensive.

As declared by Nasrallah, “we did not want this war, but we are fighting it because it was imposed on us.” Although it appears that Hizbollah neither deliberately ignited a large-scale conflict that could engulf the entire region nor ignorantly miscalculated the likelihood of such a scenario, now that this war has been set in motion Hizbollah has not shied away from utilizing it in the service of its regional and domestic objectives, which are described below.

Hizbollah’s Strategic Objectives in the Current Conflict Military Objectives
One of Hizbollah’s central objectives in this war is the creation of new definitions of power and victory that cannot be measured in quantitative or material terms. This process has been facilitated by three factors. The first is the very high, ultimately unattainable bar that Israel set for itself at the beginning of the conflict—eliminating Hizbollah—and Israel’s consequent need to change its goals thereafter. Second, and conversely, is the fact that Hizbollah did not clearly articulate any military objectives to begin with, save for its intent to secure a prisoner exchange at some point. It logically follows that a military victory for Hizbollah merely consists of denying Israel the ability to secure any tangible achievement.

To date, Hizbollah appears to have succeeded insofar as Israel has not attained any of its declared military goals, i.e. the unconditional release of the two Israeli soldiers, the dismantlement or severe weakening of Hizbollah’s capacity to continue resisting Israeli forces, the neutralization of Hizbollah’s rocket capability, or pushing Hizbollah back to the Litani River. The third is the asymmetrical nature of the warfare—the Israeli Defense Forces’ vast size and strength compared to Hizbollah’s guerilla forces amplifies any sign of military weakness on the Israeli side and any indication of strength from Hizbollah’s side. These features of the conflict have enabled Nasrallah to declare that Hizbollah’s very survival constitutes a victory, as does what he has called its “steadfastness in front of the fiercest military power” and its “continuation with the confrontation.”

Hizbollah also regards itself as triumphant for having outperformed all conventional armies which have fought Israel throughout the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This includes Hizbollah’s ability to blunt the Israeli incursion, inflict losses on the Israeli army, and more significantly, take the conflict to Israel itself through rocket attacks. While these short-term goals are about Hizbollah’s own survival and status, Hizbollah also strives for longer term objectives which aim at shattering the myth of Israeli military invincibility. In a telling recent public speech, Nasrallah agreed with Shimon Peres’s assertion that the conflict was an existential one for Israel. Ruling out the notion of “liberating Palestine” and “destroying” Israel, Nasrallah construed Peres’s “life and death” statement as indicative of Israel’s fear of the ramifications of a Hizbollah victory on the future of Israel. As explicated by Nasrallah, “when the people of this transient state lose their confidence in their legendary army, the end of this entity will begin. This is because Israel is a state that was established for an army, and in Israel there is no army made to serve a state.” Hizbollah views the Israeli state as being subordinate to its military, which defines the very nature, identity, and foundation of the state. According to this line of reasoning, once this military is given its first taste of defeat, the foundations of the state will be shaken and Israel will begin to unravel.

Political Objectives
Another central objective of Hizbollah is to confront Washington’s “New Middle East” initiative and to frustrate the plan’s realization both in Lebanon and the region. In Hizbollah’s view, the only forces capable of stopping the U.S. plan are the main actors of the strategic axis which encompasses Syria, Iran, Hizbollah, and Hamas. It is for this reason that the United States seeks to eliminate them from its path, beginning with Hizbollah in Lebanon. This perception has only been exacerbated by the U.S. government’s framing of the current conflict as part of both the war on terrorism and President Bush’s freedom agenda, as exemplified by Bush’s recent contention that Hizbollah is “willing to kill and to use violence to stop the spread of peace and democracy,” and his characterization of the war as “part of a larger struggle between the forces of freedom and the forces of terror in the Middle East.” Hizbollah officials believe they have a “destiny to confront this accursed plan and to thwart the goals of this war,” which includes stripping Lebanon of its “history, commitments, culture, and true identity to become an American-Zionist Lebanon.”

Hizbollah’s war with Israel thus becomes “an affirmation of the people’s right to resist occupation and the rejection of the American imperialistic tendency,” in the words of Mohammed Fneish. By blocking U.S. objectives in this war, Hizbollah will “obstruct the American plan” for the region “not in its aims but its results.” Hizbollah’s linking of the outcome of the current fighting with the success or failure of the U.S. Middle East plan is evinced by Nasrallah’s depiction of the conflict as “surpassing Lebanon….it is the conflict of the umma,” whose results will reverberate throughout the entire region. Given the immense popularity Hizbollah now enjoys in the Sunni Arab mainstream and among Islamist movements, the outcome of the war will have significant consequences not only for U.S. and Israeli goals in the region but also for the so-called “moderate” Arab regimes, whose substantial deference to the U.S.-Israeli line has been cast into sharper relief.

Amal Saad-Ghorayeb is an assistant professor at the Lebanese American University in Beirut. She writes regularly on Lebanese politics and is the author of Hizbullah: Politics and Religion

What is the logic behind this war?

This is what Israel causes everytime it decides to go into a violent war. More unecessary hatred and problems. Maybe this is why Haaretz chose to publish the following commentary.

Israel should pack up and go
By Nadim Shehadi

What is the logic that will emerge from this war? If Israel can exist only by destroying the neighborhood, then it's time to declare it a failed state. The Zionist dream has turned into a nightmare and is not viable. If the future holds more of the same, then the time has come to reconsider the whole project. Every state has a duty to defend its citizens, but also it has a duty to provide them with security and the two are different.
The prospects are for more destruction, fanaticism, violence and hatred. No unilateral separation can isolate Israel from this, nor can the region or the world live with the consequences. This seems to be the only choice, and Israel must do itself and others a favor and go away. The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza shows a country deprived of all humanity. The West Bank is unliveable, the population strangled into three prison clusters. Concrete barriers, barbed wires, bypass roads, human beings emerging like rats from underground tunnels, daily humiliation from hundreds of checkpoints. Gaza has been under siege since the population dared to elect Hamas, its infrastructure has been obliterated and its population has been driven to despair in what now seems like a dress rehearsal for what was to come in Lebanon. Lebanon woke up on July 12 to a reality that can destroy the very fabric of society. Divided between those who believe in a "riviera" with consensus politics, power sharing and a weak state, and those who, like Hezbollah, see the necessity of having a fortress to resist an evil and dangerous enemy. Israel's behavior will see the logic of the latter prevail.
Yet the Lebanese system is resilient. PM Fouad Siniora, under the bombs, was able to extract a consensus for a seven-point plan where the victorious fortress accepted to go back to the political process to resolve the crisis. Lebanon still managed to challenge the U.S. and Israel through sheer persistence, and in a diplomatic tour de force it was successful in steering the UN Security Council toward a political rather than military solution. For the first time, Arab foreign ministers have been mobilized and actively lobbied international legality. There is deliberate targeting of civilians: Israel can deny it, but at the very least, those Israelis who are doing it know it is true. Over 17,000 people were killed in the invasion of 1982, and the net result was the creation of Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. There is a doctrine that says Arabs need to be crushed, that they can be bombed into submission, that they will eventually fall on their knees. It is the doctrine, not its application, that is flawed. It says that by terrorizing the population, they will respect us and make peace; it says that those who dare resist need to be eradicated through targeted assassination and their supporters annihilated no matter what the cost. The only lessons Israel learned is that it should do it better next time. Three Arab countries have peace treaties or diplomatic relations with Israel, most of the Gulf states have or had commercial bureaus, Saudi Arabia came up with the King Abdallah plan offering Israel normalization - something that was not achieved in nearly 30 years of peace with Egypt. Tunisia and Morocco have excellent relations with Israel. Even rogues like Syria and Libya give out positive vibes - the former desperate to resume peace talks unconditionally. The region has a history of tolerance and coexistence; minorities, including Jews, have survived and prospered for centuries. Israel is blind to any positive developments, and this will soon make these positions and those who hold them disappear, their stance untenable. Lebanon can reconstruct airports, roads, bridges, and factories; bury and mourn the dead, rebuild shattered lives. Israel has barely been there for 60 years, a millisecond in history, but enough time to judge the results. If the fundamental moral logic is flawed, then it is time to give up, pack up and go.

The writer, a Lebanese economist, is an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Program at Chatham House.

What's next?

(The video had some sound problems, this is why there is an effect of an echo)

The video is exclusive footage Beirut Live was able to acquire of the Israeli bombing of the bridge extension which leads to the Middle East's highest bridge, in Sofar. The image was taken in the first week of the crisis and is one of the hundreds of attacks on Lebanese infrastructure.
Now that a cease-fire just went into effect, we are hopeful it will hold and last. But when the dust settles, we will be facing two major internal problems - one of them could be potentially difficult, the other potentially fatal.
The first will focus on the economic problem. Our infrastructure is devastated and so are thousands of businesses, factories and agriculturalists alike. However, Sweden has said that it will host an international aid conference for Lebanon on August, 31 with representatives of 60 governments and organizations invited. This is expected to bring about a lot of aid that will hopefully empower us to repair a lot of the damage. But Lebanon has already lost enormous amount of money from this conflict, and many people are bankrupt while other are out of a job. How will these people make an income?
The other problem is the fatal one: the internal political struggle will soon appear in the form of two fighting clans: the ones who back Hezbollah and the ones who want them to disarm. This is what we, in Lebanon, are worried about today. How will this political struggle turn out? Can it lead to the worst of our fears? We hope not...

A bunch of Gangs

Sunday the 13th of August – two days after Resolution 1701 was unanimously agreed on and one day before the cease-fire became effective. Hopes in Lebanon, and surely in Israel, were high. Will we have quiet? Will this lead to a lasting peace? My instincts tell me no, unfortunately. Let me share with you why.
Try and imagine that you have just lived through a month-long conflict which has not only destroyed your country but has also completely drained you. All day long, for one entire month, news of death, destruction and sounds of explosions just a couple of kilometers away. Suddenly and out of the blue all the rumors that this conflict will last much longer than anticipated evaporated when Resolution 1701 was voted for. And even though we couldn’t put too much faith in it, we had to admit that it was definitely a step in the right direction. We are hopeful.
This Sunday was a beautiful day indeed. The world officially agreed on the cease-fire. Nasrallah officially agreed on the cease-fire. The Lebanese government officially agreed on the cease-fire. All that remained was Israel’s cabinet to officially agree on the cease-fire on that sunny Sunday.
Now try and imagine that after that long month, all you needed was a moment of relaxation, a moment of peace. At last you could lie down and start believing that miracles do happen. You fall asleep with that thought in your mind believing that the future will become a great one. But before you could actually allow that dream to materialize an unbelievable set of explosions resonate throughout all of Beirut. 18 massive missiles were dropped on Beirut’s southern suburbs in less than a minute. Yes, less than a minute. Never during the entire conflict did such a set of explosions take place. And as soon as the TV is turned on to see what just happened, a breaking news alert appears on the bottom of the screen which read: “The Cabinet of Israel has officially agreed on the cease-fire.” A cease-fire indeed, it was like a ‘grande finale’. And 30 minutes after the massive explosions took place, the news stated that Hizbullah launched its largest barrage of rockets on Northern Israel in one day since the start of the conflict – an unbelievable total of some 250 rockets.
People in Lebanon continuously tell me that this is the way a cease-fire takes place, with a grande finale. Well all I can think of is that there are two parties which only want one thing: to fight each other. This is their way of saying it’s not the end.